Introduction
Our paper forms part of the general problematic of the SAHWA Project, 2 which asks questions about the fate of the social group of young people in the Arab world and, more particularly, in the countries of the south and east of the Mediterranean basin (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia), since the socio-political earthquakes engendered by what is commonly called the "Arab Spring". Our paper concentrates on the specific issue of the relations between young people in Arab societies and the issue of migration now that it has taken on troubling and dangerous proportions. Our paper does not include the case of Tunisia, due to the authors not having received the report on that country's migration policy These days, immigration along the south-north axis has grown to alarming proportions. To be sure, the phenomenon is a historical fact. But the novelty is that the new migratory configurations involve many more young people and irregular and illegal forms are wellestablished. In this context, the Arab Mediterranean countries are notable for being "exporter"
countries of migrants and invite, as a result, questioning of the dysfunctionalities eroding their inefficient social systems. Further still, these same countries are increasingly becoming incorporated into the largest international migratory movements, making them countries of both destination and of transit for migrants and asylum seekers.
So in accordance with the issue of migration in the AMCs, our aims revolve around the following points:
a. To provide a full picture of the issue of international migrations in the Arab
Mediterranean countries through a description of their current evolution and integrating the decisive changes at various levels that characterise the region.
b. To understand the rationale behind the new migration order, in the sense of grasping the potential changes as well as the constants.
c. To analyse migration policies along two fundamental axes: the brain drain and remittances, and the conditions of the relations established between the migrants' countries of departure and destination, taking into account the political, economic and security issues that they represent.
To meet the assigned objectives we have made use of the SAHWA study data on young people as well as the results of numerous studies and pieces of research related to the subject.
In terms of research methods, the SAHWA Project focusses on five Arab countries in the southern Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, where the qualitative survey was performed on an overall sample of 10,000 young people aged from 15
to 29 years old. 3 Because of the complexity of the issues approached, the data analysed are both qualitative and quantitative. At the first level (the survey), a questionnaire was used structured around the following themes: education, employment, cultures and values, political engagement and two transversal themes: migration and gender. At the qualitative level (Ethnographic Fieldwork), 4 four techniques were used: focus groups, Life Stories, narrative interviews and Focused Ethnography. The analysis phase resulted in five national reports produced by the teams of the project's five partners, 5 in line with the demands of the mixed research method, 6 combining the figures and the qualitative data.
Situation of international migration in the Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs): changes in continuity
It has become almost banal to show the substantial differences between specialists in the field -scholars, politicians and institutions -when it comes to the numbers of migrants in each individual country, making reference to the striking disparities in definitional, apparent or latent positions. Although aware of the limits of the coded language of describing international migration, we do not claim to be above attempts at quantification even if they may be read as an order of magnitude that can be improved.
These past decades, a new trend and dynamic has been established in the AMCs' migratory movements. They have become part of an unprecedented strategy at both geographical and human levels, and, for the countries of the Maghreb, its shape fits almost exclusively with the lines of colonial heritage.
According to the World Bank, cited by Bardak (2015: 21) the number of international migrants from the AMCs in 2011 was as follows:
-Egypt: 3.7 million migrants out of a total population of 79.39 million.
-Morocco: 3 million migrants out of 32.06 million inhabitants.
-Algeria: 1.2 million migrants out of a total population of 37.76 million.
-Lebanon: 1 million migrants out of a total population of 4.38 million.
-Tunisia: 650,000 migrants living abroad out of a population of 10.67 million inhabitants.
Although the data on the Maghreb is limited, it does provide with a valuable indication: that migrants from the central Maghreb make up 5.8% of the total population of the Arab Maghreb Union. A notably superior rate to the global average, which is 3.2% (Musette, 2016: 35-43) .
In absolute terms, Egypt has the highest number of migrants in the AMCs, followed closely by Morocco. These two countries are notable for the high number of their people living abroad. But in terms of the rate of emigration, it is Lebanon that is characterised by the highest level of emigrants. It is 28th in the list of countries with the highest levels of emigration of those with higher education qualifications (PNUD, 2016: 268 The Lebanese, for their part, are also characterised by the diversification of the destinations of their migratory flows. These grew during the 1975-1990 war and have continued to grow as a result of the situations at the time on the economic, political and security levels.
With regard to the human component, a consensus emerges in the writing on migration in the Mediterranean and the AMCs (De Hass, 2007; Charef, 2007; Abedellaoui, 2009; Abi Samra, 2010; Fargues, 2013; Bardak, 2015; Kasparian, 2013) highlighting the fact that the new waves of migrant populations are characterised by their youth. This trend may easily be understood when we underline later that unemployment in the AMCs particularly concerns first-time jobseekers as well as the holders of university qualifications.
Another distinctive trait worth emphasising concerns the high -or even very high -levels of qualification of the new generations of migrants coming from the AMCs. Faced with the intensity of the brain drain in Lebanon and to a lesser degree in Morocco, we may reasonably ask the following question: is there or can there be gains from the brain drain ("brain gain") in terms of the movement of competences and the optimal use of the potential of the diaspora?
Should this represent an objective that should guide the relations of states with their diasporas, or are the benefits of remittances enough to compensate given the fact that in Lebanon, for example, one household in two has an emigrant relative? (Kasparian, 2013) .
In the new migration landscape, the issue of gender is strong and persistent. Indeed, previously, if women always formed part of the migratory flows in the AMCs, it was because of their position as a family member. Girls and mothers with families took part more often than not with the aim of family reunification. What appears to be new in the structure of the migrants from the AMCs is observing women who hold medium, high, or very high levels of education that may allow them to go and live abroad without a male family presence. This is a new attitude that coincides with the appearance of new destinations, as is the case of Canada for Algerian migrants, for example. The same sign of feminisation can be seen in emigration in Morocco. However, it must be said that the progressive feminisation of migratory flows has not reached the same levels for Lebanon and Egypt. The reason for this is linked to the dominant destinations of these two countries, namely, the oil-producing countries of the Gulf.
This tendency is easily explained by reference to the status and social position of women in countries such as these where conservative values dominate.
Highlighting the profiles of the migrants allows us to accept the theory of the new generation that represents irrefutable proof of what must be acknowledged to be the new migratory pattern of our countries, which must be a decisive element in all migratory policy.
Furthermore, we note in the literature on international migration that the economic factor, through employment, is the essential reason people dream of going to live in a country other than their own. Indeed, the AMCs suffer from high unemployment rates. This lack of employment opportunities particularly affects first-time jobseekers, who happen to be young people. This common characteristic in young people's relationship with the labour market could be approached via the great imbalance being produced between the growth of the population and economic growth. The point of impact materialises, especially, in the social pressure exerted by the youth bulge on the capacities of the labour market to meet the demand (Bricker & Foly, 2013) . The rising numbers of young people as a group in the structure of a society is not necessarily a sufficient condition for generating a social inclusion problem. The real and decisive causes are found in the pressure applied by young people on the population as a whole by means of the labour market. Thus, faced with structural unemployment linked to economic growth, in the eyes of young people migration is the appropriate solution.
The shallowness of the labour market and the deficit in job supply has today become a characteristic of the AMCs and, more generally, the Arab world. Those who stated their hope of emigrating in search of better study and training opportunities made up 15%. Young people are highly critical of the education system and its relationship to the labour market. On this issue, a young Egyptian explained it thus: "Yes, there are job opportunities with a university degree, but the problem that we encounter is that we haven't received practical education at school. We have only learnt books, nothing practical." 
The brain drain: a loss of earnings
The brain drain phenomenon is the most significant reflection of the inadequacies of the education systems in the AMCs and their relationship to the labour market. The significant part of the state budget spent on the education system at its different levels cannot be content only to perform the social function of the educational institution. Because in the terms of the issue of the economy and education, the latter affects the economic and social development of a country.
The highly controversial issue of the brain drain aligns with this new order of migrant populations in the AMCs, namely, that labourers and low-skilled people have been joined by candidates holding high qualifications and skills. Doctors, engineers, liberal professionals, researchers and others seek new horizons to bring value to their skills and ambitions (Fargues, 2005 , De Haas, 2007 . In this regard, the data from the French National Medical Council [Zehnati, 2016] ).
The desire of senior workers, on whom the state has agreed to spend enormous amounts, to go and work abroad is, without doubt, the visible face of an enormous contradiction. A study carried out in Morocco observes that the annual emigration of 1,500 engineers abroad costs
Morocco around $47 million. That is the proof, of undeniable importance, that the brain drain phenomenon is not merely the result of economic conditions linked only to jobs. This has led Charef (2009: 40) to underline that both the material and immaterial have a role to play in people's fulfilment. The SAHWA survey brings more clarity in this area. Indeed, when young people are asked about attraction factors in their desire to emigrate, they speak, first of all, of the quality of the way of life (37.4%) of the country in which they want to settle (especially European countries). They also share the hope of living abroad (39.3%) because they feel that in their country there is a notable absence of the adequate framework to satisfy their needs as young people.
It is necessary to investigate the socioeconomic, political and cultural environment as a whole to be able to grasp the underpinnings of young people's attitudes in the AMCs. This methodological position that is adequately expressed in the following words: "Migration may also be understood as a political reaction to the nepotism and clientelism that plague all Arab countries, including education and professional systems. The structural adjustment plans, which were seen as prerequisites for political reform in ossified polities, in fact achieve the opposite" (UNDP, 2016: 156) .
In its most immediate consequences, the unemployment of university graduates undoubtedly has a negative impact on young people pursuing university studies. Success in their studies and the corresponding return on them in terms of the acquisition of a social position is shattered by the unemployment of university graduates. As the results of the SAHWA survey (2016) show, a significant proportion of young people at various stages of the training cycle express a desire to go abroad not for a short visit but in the hope of settling there. 
Remittances: a false compensation
In all the debates on the issue of international migration an implicit aspect of regret and frustration appears linked to the fact that migration means leaving one's family, parents, loved ones and friends, etc. In a word: leaving the land of one's birth to go and live in another country definitively or not.
The positive aspect stems from the fact that the movement of money can have an effect on the level of household poverty, improving living standards by covering expenses linked to different requirements ranging from the satisfaction of basic needs to saving and investment.
Indeed, we are tempted to surrender to the facts when we observe the sums of money transferred to the AMCs. In 2015, the World Bank put forward the following sums: $19.7bn sent by migrants to Egypt, $7.2bn to Lebanon, $6.4bn to Morocco, $2.3bn to Tunisia and $2 billion to Algeria. For certain countries like Morocco and Egypt these funds represent the main source of foreign currency inflow. However, it must be underlined that the real values transferred are much larger than those mentioned above, especially in Algeria and Egypt (European Commission, 2010: 76) , as they may take place outside the official banking circuit, whether through borrowing via informal networks -highly beneficial exchange rates on the parallel market -or going down the route of non-monetary, cheap, technological transfers.
Several studies and reports (Musette, 2006; Kasparian, 2013; Mouhoud, 2013; UNICEF, 2014 , among others) confirm the economic and social advantages of remittances.
Nevertheless, though they play an undeniably positive role in the short and medium term on families' levels of poverty in migrants' countries of origin, their effect is considerably reduced and even very weak in the long term as they are in the main directed towards 2006: 18-19 ). In the relationship between migrants and their country of origin the foundations must be laid of an attitude of confidence among potential migrant investors along with a policy of encouragement on the part of the public powers in the country of origin. But it would be incorrect to limit the effects of migration to transfers in terms of money. Several other routes may be taken to exploit the skills pools that the diaspora might possess. We will attempt to explore such a route in the framework of analysing the migration policy of the AMCs.
The limits of migration policy
Apart from certain isolated experiences where migrations have taken place following intergovernmental agreements, in the AMCs nearly all migration is the result of individual initiative and decision-making upon which the public powers have no impact. It is left, therefore, to the migration policy framework to manage the migrant population once they are settled in a foreign land, as they are citizens with full national rights and are registered through consular services. Hence, migration policy may be applied a priori and a posteriori. It is applied -or may be applied -before the migratory act occurs, above all for qualified and However, migration policy cannot be limited only to the issue of remittances, though they are important and decisive. They seek to exploit the potential of the skills and know-how of the diasporas in order to find all the formulas likely to contribute to the development of the country of origin. Hence the number of initiatives being taken to set up a solid capital network that is worthy of being the basis of the effective and efficient movement of skills. Often the reactions of the members of diasporas urge the building of lasting ties through calm, rigour and organisation in the image of the World Lebanese Cultural Union, a key structure in the diaspora associations (meant to be apolitical and non-religious), which has been subject, in a politicisation drive, to numerous control and domination attempts by the state institutions. In fact, the non-economic contribution of the diaspora takes the form of transferring skills to the country of origin where there is a need for expertise. The networks formed secure the ties and their development between the two sides.
In the AMCs' migration policies, the cultural, identity and religious issues have not been neglected by the decision-makers and conceivers of the programmes. In reality, giving a full account of the migration policy in the AMCs only through a discussion of the flows from them as countries of migrant departure, leads us to omit from the analysis the effects of the migratory transition they are currently undergoing, which is making them countries of transit and immigration.
The AMCs, lands of transit and immigration
In the context of the migratory phenomenon's evolution, these days an inter-African process of migration is being produced which is tending to widen the spaces and diversify the corridors of migration movements in a general manner. Like other countries that have gone through the same migration experience, such as Italy and Spain, the AMCs are living through their migratory transition (Boubakri, 2007: 3) , making them not only countries of migrant departure but also lands of transit and immigration. Global movement gives these countries the increasingly significant characteristic of lands of passage, while the goal of the migrants is to reach the countries of southern Europe.
We may, on this basis, ask ourselves why this phenomenon arises, or at least explore the increasingly large dimension it has taken on, particularly from the 1990s onwards. In fact this new migration route has emerged as a reaction to the closure of European borders as part of a policy of fighting irregular migration, the imposition of a visa system and also as a Looking more closely, this is a situation of extreme sensitivity, for the very fact that the AMCs find themselves simultaneously in three different positions, which makes the production of a coherent overall strategy highly problematic: they are countries of migrant departure, transit and immigration all at once. Said another way, the national policy on the migration phenomenon must be based on conciliatory principles, of which only a thoughtful political flexibility is up to simultaneously handling the pressures of a political, economic, judicial, diplomatic and security nature. The Arab Mediterranean countries find themselves between, on the one side, the cooperation and partnership agreements and bilateral treaties signed with the EU, and on the other, freedom of movement agreements complying with regional and continental agreements made at several levels with their partners in sub-Saharan Africa as part of the African countries' cooperation framework, NEPAD.
Besides this, it should be said that the surveillance and control implemented in the southern parts of the countries of North Africa, notably Algeria and Tunisia, have also been strengthened for security purposes due to the consequences in the region of the armed conflicts in the Sahel (Libya, Niger and Mali among others). In this way irregular immigration in the AMCs places them in an uncomfortable situation because of the difficult balance to be made between the regional neighbourhood, economics, security, human and legal policies. The position seems to be complying with the short-term specificities of reconciling tolerance and rigour. Thus, of the 140,000 to 150,000 foreigners living in Morocco, it is estimated that half are in an irregular situation, and that 10,000 to 20,000 are originally from sub-Saharan Africa and Syria. The public powers first responded with a mass return, but under pressure from humanitarian organisations, notably the National Human Rights Council, the Moroccan government has begun to move towards regularisation and a large number of irregular migrants have benefitted.
Despite the diversity and defectiveness of the statistical data on the foreign population in
Algeria, it appears, according to the Algerian Ministry of Labour, that there were 140,000
foreign workers with a work permit. 11 The estimates of irregular migrants in Algeria are around 120,000 people. 12 The Algerian authorities seek to protect themselves from becoming an area of transit by increasing controls, and implementing arrests and renewals at the borders. Hence, they request cooperation in these readmission operations from the 
Irregular migration and refugees: an absolute urgency
These days, it is not wrong to assume that the debate and reflection on migration is dominated by its aspect of illegality. Not only is this phenomenon the most dramatic and the most spectacular of the modes of migration, it is also growing. In this regard, the figures are revealing: during 2016 -still not finished at the time of writing -we note that more than 89,000 migrants, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa have reached the coasts of Italy. The attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea have led to the drowning of 3,000 people, a number that is 50% higher than the number of deaths in 2015 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).
In terms of the AMCs, 2014 was a peak in this field: irregular emigration flows rose by 170%. more than 40,000 people were subject to arrest in their attempt to illegally cross the borders (Boubakri & Mazella, 2005: 152) .
Thus, the question that arises is: why does this trend towards the growth of irregular movements -supporting risk-taking and fatalism without precedent -in the context of the international movement of people? This growth has taken place in response to the set of control and restriction measures (drastic reduction of mobility and the imposition of the visa system) taken from the 1970s onwards by the majority of western European countries.
This highly complex fact means the mitigation procedures concern the countries of departure and those of destination equally. In this sense, we can clearly see that in the destination countries, irregular migration is an issue, notably because migrants' position of dependence gives certain employers an advantage in terms of working conditions and salary levels. In order to take a position on a segment of the labour market, we should bow to the evidence that irregular migrants have "… the underground economy as the only place of insertion into the labour market" (OECD, 1999: 255) . One of the most frequently recurring questions on this issue is: who are these young people risking their lives attempting to reach the countries of southern Europe?
Given the level of danger irregular migration involves, it is tempting to think that it is only a situation of poverty, and perhaps of extreme poverty and profound desperation, that could push young people to take such a risk. Yet, the reality is quite different because it is not only the poorest young people living in great precariousness who begin such an adventure due to its exorbitant cost. In reality, the young people come from all sections of the population, which reflects the reaction to the restrictions imposed on the free circulation of people as well as their intense desire to reach Europe to live there.
What is more, political crises, armed conflicts and civil wars are also circumstances that cause and intensify the human tragedies that result in the loss of human lives as well as the grave consequences of injuries and mutilation. Such situations have accompanied human societies throughout history, and these days the tragic recent events in Syria are added to them, recording, in the space of five years, the loss of 250,000 human lives and more than a million seeking to join the European El Dorado without no limit on the price to be paid should be admitted.
Either way, we are tempted to assume that, confronted with the imbroglio and the sensitivity of the situation, to which are added the mass displacements in Europe of refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, it is at the security level that Europe has shown most willingness. For this reason bilateral agreements, with their operational nature, prevail over all other forms of collaboration between the countries concerned by irregular migration.
They take, thus, the form of pressure exerted on the AMCs through different partnership structures, demanding a more effective operational arsenal and predisposition to the end of reducing irregular migration. This can be observed in the numerous calls made by European governments, notably France, Italy, Spain and Germany, and through varied forms of aid with the goal of alleviating, first, the flows coming from sub-Saharan countries and the Sahel. But for the AMCs it is also about controlling the migration of their own citizens with more resolve. To this effect, several regulatory frameworks have been drawn up, negotiated, signed and implemented for the reintegration of Maghrebi citizens without papers. 13 We note that in the context of this problem, migrations reveal an issue with the relationship between fundamental human values and national interests, as it exposes the practice and limits of the philosophy of human rights and the freedom movement of individuals on one side and the economic interests and the security priorities of the countries of the other.
It is a cohabitation that is strained by the reality of handling migratory movements, where it becomes a deal and an exchange that takes place between the countries supplying and receiving the migrants. Thus, in exchange for the acceptance of readmissions by the AMCs, the latter benefit from multiple advantages such as development aid, as these statements by 
Conclusion
Having analysed the economic, sociological and political aspects that directly or indirectly affect the evolution of the phenomenon of youth migration in the AMCs, all the data points towards an important fact: in these countries the dominant trend is towards the permanence of In line with this new trend, it is equally remarkable that the AMCs are progressively aligning with the new logic characterising the globalisation of the migration movements in the sense that they are becoming lands of transit for migrants moving towards Europe but also countries of immigration. Finally, the last result of our work related to the increasing significance of irregular migration in the AMCs, leaving in its wake a certain "confusion" between refugees seeking asylum and migrants seeking work. There is no doubt that the remittances from which the families of migrants benefit contribute considerably to the reduction of poverty in a highly significant number of households in the AMCs. The impact on the gross domestic product of these countries is not demonstrated, but is it sufficient to compensate for the losses of the brain drain?
In reality, the result of the relationship between the two is the fruit of a strategy and choices that are decided at the highest levels. At all events, in light of the truth of the facts, it turns out that priority is given to the immediate over the long term in the sense that contributions on the economic level have more weight than those of the human capital of a nation and the investment made in it. However, this poses an immeasurable risk to society of making the state of dependency permanent: human capital is the key asset on which all the strategies of economic and social development of a society rest.
In highlighting the prospects of the migratory flows in the AMCs, it is worth noting that in these countries there is a great imbalance between the startling demographic bulge of the social category of young people and the level of economic growth. The point of impact is at the level of the incapacity of the second to respond effectively to the needs of the first.
Ultimately, the AMCs have the highest levels of youth unemployment in the world. Given the failure of large-scale economic projects implemented by the state and the private sector to provide growth and create employment, it is opportune if not imperative to diversify the routes and means of creating economic activities. The diffusion of the culture of entrepreneurship among the youth population, in order to deal with unemployment, particularly among first-time jobseekers, is a strategy that is worth considering as a way to include young people in the world of economic activity, guarantee their social inclusion and thereby reduce their desire to emigrate.
However, youth migration is not only linked to economic motives to the extent that young workers, academics in training and others feel the need to leave their country to go and live elsewhere. To this end, it is the task of the decision-makers to encourage research and reflection on the human environment and non-economic material of young people's lives in order to identify their needs and act on the indicators of their social inclusion.
Recommendations
1. To the extent that international migrations are also the result of the imbalances in the relationship between the economic and demographic dimensions of societies, it is imperative for the countries that provide migrants to propagate and disseminate the culture of birth control.
2. Rehabilitate the socioeconomic role of school (representation of university degrees) in parallel with the formalisation of the economy so that the relationship between the levers of social success and levels of qualification are legitimated and are seen as such by young people.
3. Encourage all measures that work towards the social recognition of young people by including them in all decision-making structures, especially those that directly concern them. 4. Put in place structures of research and reflection on young people for the purposes carrying out regular surveys to know the wishes of each category of young people and act in consequence.
5. Target the inclusion of qualified and highly qualified young people by offering them the means of expressing their competence and placing them in positions of responsibility.
6. Spread the culture of entrepreneurship among young people by including it in school programmes.
7. Migration is best managed through active cooperation between the countries involved.
For this reason, international cooperation and partnership based on the guiding principle of shared interests should be encouraged.
8. Establish permanent trusting dialogue between departure and destination countries with a view to putting into practice a common development policy. 
